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STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ* 
 
Under Section 9-309(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, sales of “payment intangibles” are 
automatically perfected without the requirement of filing financing statements. Originally intended 
as a concession to the banking industry (to perfect sales of loan participations without filing), this 
provision has become a trap for the unwary—including unwary banks. It misleads those who think 
they’re buying payment intangibles (and thus need not file to perfect) only to find out, too late, 
that a court has construed that arcane definition too narrowly. It also undermines the ability to 
know one’s priority in purchased or pledged payment intangibles. This essay analyses these 
problems, examines their historical origins, and suggests potential solutions. 
 Introduction.  A bank pays $47 million, fair value, to purchase certain rights to payment 
under equipment leases. The seller of these rights eventually goes bankrupt, and its trustee in 
bankruptcy claims that the seller—not the bank—actually owns these rights even though they 
were purportedly sold. This nightmarish scenario is real, and indeed has been “blessed” by a 
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bankruptcy court.2 Most troubling, the trustee in bankruptcy’s claim and the bankruptcy court’s 
decision are not based on any hint of fraud or inequities; rather, they result from a well 
intentioned, though misguided, provision of revised Article 9 (“Revised Article 9”) of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”)—Section 9-309(3), providing for automatic perfection of 
sales of payment intangibles.  
 “Automatic perfection” means that sales of payment intangibles are perfected when they 
occur,3 without the need to file financing statements (filing being the U.C.C.’s default rule for 
perfection4). The automatic-perfection rule originated in a political compromise between the 
drafters of Revised Article 9 and the banking lobby. When Revised Article 9 expanded the 
category of intangible rights whose sale was governed by the U.C.C.,5 banks realized the 
expansion would include loan participations, a form of payment intangible consisting of 
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undivided interests in loans.6 They then became concerned that requiring perfection by filing 
could be burdensome and costly to the large inter-bank market in loan-participation sales.  
 Banks argued that, prior to Revised Article 9, they were not required to file financing 
statements to perfect sales of loan participations,7 so automatic perfection would simply reflect 
existing banking practice.8 Although the drafters of Revised Article 9 ultimately accepted 
automatic perfection as a compromise, this essay shows that it is a compromise that creates traps 
for the unwary—and that, ironically, banks are among those most likely to fall into these traps.    
 Problems Caused by Automatic Perfection:  Automatic perfection causes two 
fundamental problems—one a “non-perfection” problem, the other a “priority” problem. The 
non-perfection problem results from certain complexities and subtleties, discussed in the next 
paragraph, associated with the term “payment intangibles.” These complexities and subtleties can 
make it hard for a buyer of intangible rights to determine whether its rights are payment 
intangibles, which are automatically perfected, or other intangible rights for which the U.C.C. 
requires filing for perfection. If the buyer decides wrong and does not file, the buyer’s ownership 
of those rights can be avoided in the event of the seller’s subsequent bankruptcy. Avoidance 
occurs through the mechanism of U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2), which provides that an unperfected 
security interest—which, under U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(35) and 9-109 (and Official Comment 5 
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thereto), includes most ownership interests in intangible rights—is subordinate to the rights of a 
trustee in bankruptcy.9  
 Payment intangibles are defined as “general intangible[s] under which the account 
debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.”10 Confusion can arise because the term 
“general intangible” is a catch-all, consisting effectively of all intangible rights “other than 
accounts, chattel paper” and other such U.C.C.-delineated categories of intangible rights. In order 
to conclude an intangible right is a payment intangible, one first must conclude it does not fall 
within any of these other categories. These categories, however, can be complex and exceedingly 
subtle. 
 For example, in In re Commercial Money Center, the intangible rights at issue consisted 
of rights to payment to certain lease installments. NetBank believed, in my view correctly, that 
these intangible rights were payment intangibles, not falling within any other U.C.C.-delineated 
category of intangible rights. The trustee in bankruptcy argued, though, that these intangible 
rights constituted “chattel paper” because that term includes “a record or records that evidence 
both a monetary obligation and a … lease of specific goods.”11 Although NetBank countered that 
the intangible rights could not be chattel paper because they neither constitute a “record” nor 
“evidence” the lease—rather, they were merely rights payable under the lease—the bankruptcy 
judge disagreed. Holding (in my view, incorrectly) that the intangible rights were chattel paper, 
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the judge then concluded (correctly, given that flawed premise) that their sale required perfection 
by filing. Because NetBank had not filed financing statements, it was unperfected. 
 The disagreement over the U.C.C. nature of rights to payment under leases illustrated by 
the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Commercial Money Center is disturbing because that 
should have been a relatively easy case.12 Two prominent commercial law commentators have 
observed, for example: 
Our biggest concern about the [bankruptcy court’s decision in the In re Commercial 
Money Center] case is its holding that the rental streams, standing by themselves, should 
be characterized as chattel paper rather than payment intangibles. The court thought its 
decision was true to the “plain language” of the U.C.C., but that’s questionable . . . .  The 
carved-out payment streams seem to fit the definition of “payment intangible” like a 
glove.13 
 
Indeed, it appears that banks may routinely regard rights to payment under leases as payment 
intangibles, and therefore do not file to perfect the sale of those rights.14 
That this degree of controversy exists for so obvious an example of a payment intangible 
augers poorly for the many truly more difficult cases. And the In re Commercial Money Center 
bankruptcy court’s interpretation of § 9-309(3), if sustained on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, only 
compounds the controversy, suggesting, for example, that even participations in equipment loans 
could be chattel paper whose sale requires perfection by filing.15  
                                                 
12 Cf. note 2, supra (bankruptcy appellate panel overturning that case). 
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 Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, Rental Payment Streams Are “Chattel Paper” Rather than “Payment 
Intangibles,” CLARK’S SEC. TRANS. MONTHLY Aug. 2005 at 3 (emphasis added). 
14
 Interview with Charles Mooney, Charles A. Heimbold, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, and Co-Reporter, Revised Article 9 (Jan. 5, 2006). 
15
 The (twisted) rationale of the bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Commercial Money Center compels this 
conclusion where, under U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(11), the equipment loans themselves are secured by security interests 
in specific goods.  
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 Some might propose solving this problem by filing financing statements for all sales of 
intangible rights, as a prophylactic measure. But § 9-309(3) would still remain a trap for the 
unwary who, after reading § 9-309(3), justifiably believe they are automatically perfected and fail 
to file prophylactically. Furthermore, any widespread practice of prophylactic filing for sales of 
intangible rights could amount to roughly the same filing costs and burdens as simply requiring 
such filing in the first place. Additionally, even a universal practice of prophylactic filing could 
not solve the “priority” problem (discussed below), which exists independently of the non-
perfection problem.  
 The priority problem occurs because automatic perfection makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to know one’s priority in purchased or pledged payment intangibles. Whereas the 
U.C.C. filing system not only establishes but also is used to enable one to ascertain priority, 
payment intangibles sold pursuant to an automatic-perfection rule do not require filing. Any 
subsequent buyer of, or party secured by, those payment intangibles must therefore take the 
transferor’s word that such intangibles have not been previously sold. If the transferor is 
dishonest—indeed, even if the transferor is merely mistaken about the existence of a prior sale—
the subsequent buyer or secured party’s interest would be subordinate to the rights of prior 
automatically perfected buyers. The inability to know ownership priority in turn undermines the 
market for selling intangible rights and increases costs where sales do occur.16  
 
 Potential Solutions to These Problems:  There are at least a couple of potential solutions 
to these problems. Each begins by substituting a perfection-by-filing rule for sales of payment 
intangibles in place of Revised Article 9’s automatic perfection rule. 
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 One solution is simply to eliminate the automatic-perfection rule for sales of payment 
intangibles. These sales then would be perfected by filing—the U.C.C.’s default rule.17 This was 
the originally intended approach of Revised Article 9. 
 This solution is likely to meet resistance because sales of loan participations then 
technically would also require filing for perfection and, as mentioned, the banking lobby has been 
concerned that requirement would be burdensome and costly to the market in inter-bank loan-
participation sales.18 Banks believed, in contrast, that automatic perfection merely reflects pre-
Revised Article 9 banking practice.19  
 That belief may be misplaced, however. The fact that the sale of loan participations was 
not included within the scope of the U.C.C. prior to Revised Article 9 says nothing about whether 
an automatic-perfection rule then existed. Absent U.C.C. coverage, perfection of sales of loan 
participations prior to Revised Article 9 was governed by the common law and lex mercatoria.20 
That hodgepodge of laws in some cases resulted in automatic perfection of sales of loan 
participations but in many cases did not; and where it did not, it imposed even more burdensome 
and costly perfection requirements than filing, such as “policing” or notifying obligors on the 
loans.21 Banks rarely, if ever, complied with these burdensome and costly perfection 
requirements.22  
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 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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 See supra note 6 and following text. 
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 See U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 4 (2005). 
20
 See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (providing that commercial transactions not governed by the U.C.C. are to be 
governed by principles of law and equity, including the law merchant). 
21
 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private 
Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 956 n.165 (1995). See also Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized Perfection 
System for Cross-Border Receivables Financing, supra note 16, at 472-75 (discussing perfection of sales of 
intangible rights under non-U.C.C. state law).  
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 For this reason, many inter-bank sales of loan participations were unperfected prior to 
enactment of Revised Article 9. If, therefore, the automatic perfection rule under § 9-309(3) were 
replaced by a perfection-by-filing rule, banks that choose not to file often would be in no worse 
position under commercial law than they had been in prior to Revised Article 9: 
 
“‘Because few banks complied with pre-U.C.C. perfection requirements for sales of loan 
participations, the failure to comply with a perfection-by-filing requirement’ would put [banks] in 
no worse position than at present. Banks would take the insolvency risk of the selling bank, as 
they likely do now.”23 
But banks that decide to comply with such a filing requirement would be able to perfect the 
sale of loan participations with far greater certainty. In short, therefore, replacing automatic 
perfection of sales of payment intangibles with a rule requiring perfection by filing would 
essentially place banks in a no worse, and arguably a better, position than they were in prior to 
Revised Article 9.24  
 Another possible solution, more explicitly intended to address the banking industry’s 
perceived concerns, would begin by substituting a perfection-by-filing rule for sales of payment 
intangibles in place of Revised Article 9’s automatic-perfection rule; but it then would except out 
sales of loan participations between banks. This approach simply recognizes that, “as between 
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 Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, supra 
note 21, at 956 n.165.  
23
 Id. 
24
 Banks apparently did not worry much in the past about lack of perfection because the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, as receiver of failed banks, has a weaker “strong arm” power than a trustee in bankruptcy 
to challenge unperfected sales. But this same weakness of the FDIC to challenge unperfected sales is all the more 
reason for banks not to worry about a filing requirement today.      
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bank . . . purchases and sales of loan participations are not intended to facilitate commercial 
transactions but, instead, constitute a means of allocating lending risk between such 
institutions.”25  
 The exception could take several forms. It could provide, for example, that excepted sales 
of loan participations are automatically perfected, as under Revised Article 9. Alternatively, it 
could provide, as prior to Revised Article 9, that excepted sales of loan participations are not 
governed by Article 9 of the U.C.C.. In each case, the challenge is to carefully define what 
constitutes an excepted sale of loan participations.  
 At the time Revised Article 9 was being finalized, some claimed that it would be difficult 
to precisely define this type of exception. I do not see why. Loan participations are simply 
undivided interests in loans,26 and the term “bank” could be defined, for example, by reference to 
the expansive but precise litany of banking institutions that may not be debtors under the 
Bankruptcy Code.27 Indeed, a similar approach, proposed by the American Bar Association’s 
Securitized Asset Financing Task Force, was substantially adopted in the Revised Article 9 
Drafting Committee’s November 1995 draft report.  
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 Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private Legislatures, supra 
note 21, at 956 n. 168 (emphasis in original). 
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 See Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk, supra note 6 and accompanying text. I recently learned from Professor 
Mooney that, at the time Revised Article 9 was being finalized, banks also were concerned that requiring filing 
for perfection might burden potential markets for the inter-bank sale of undivided interests in letters of credit, 
banker’s acceptances, and other bank products. To the extent a filing requirement jeopardizes any such markets, 
inter-bank sales in those markets could, as appropriate, be relieved of filing requirements along the approach 
discussed above.   
27
 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2). 
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 I understand that because of continued banking industry opposition, this approach did not 
become part of Revised Article 9.28 However, in light of the In re Commercial Money Center 
debacle and the concerns laid out in this essay, perhaps it’s time that banks recognize that this 
approach may well have merit—and that § 9-309(3) represents neither their best interests nor the 
best interests of any other buyer or seller of, or party secured by, payment intangibles.  
 
                                                 
28
 Professor Mooney recalls that there may have been opposition also from non-bank financial institutions 
that buy and sell loan participations. Theoretically, at least, the approach described in the text above could be 
adapted to apply to any definable group of financial institutions. 
